Bilgisayar Korsanlığı

On July 25, 2026, we chained two critical vulnerabilities to compromise multiple OpenAI employees’ ChatGPT accounts. With these accounts, we could then access internal OpenAI repositories, and potentially many other connectors.

To prove we had in fact gained the access we believed without allowing ourselves to learn any sensitive information, we used the employee’s Codex to open a PR #1186742 in OpenAI’s internal monorepo openai/openai .

Until two months ago, any user or OpenAI employee logging into OpenAI’s own help forum ( community.openai.com ) could have had their ChatGPT and Codex accounts taken over. Since people can connect various services to Codex and ChatGPT, the scope of what we could theoretically access was huge, including GitHub, Slack and emails.

The entire timeline from initial discovery to access to OpenAI repo access took place in less than 72 hours.

We immediately reported the initial vulnerability to OpenAI and Discourse and worked with them to coordinate the patch. We appreciate their attention to detail and fast resolution of this issue. OpenAI also paid us a $6,500 bounty.

We provide a full timeline of the disclosure process here.

The rest of the post details how we discovered the two vulnerabilities, how we used claude models, as well as our takeaways from this experience.

HacktronAI team obtained remote code execution (RCE) and administrative access to the Discourse environment hosted at community.openai.com .

After confirming the cross-product impact, the team coordinated internally on the responsible disclosure process and submitted a report through OpenAI’s Bug Bounty Program on Bugcrowd.

To demonstrate the practical impact of the vulnerability, we created a harmless proof-of-concept pull request in OpenAI’s internal monorepo (link redacted at OpenAI’s request).